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“TOUCHING THE CONCERNS” OF KIOBEL: CORPORATE 
LIABILITY AND JURISDICTIONAL REMEDIES IN 
RESPONSE TO KIOBEL VS. ROYAL DUTCH  PETROLEUM 
Chinyere Kimberly  Ikegbunam* 
Introduction 
Esther Kiobel is doomed to remember the events that took the life of her 
husband and gave rise to the April 2013, United States Supreme Court 
decision Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Petroleum. She alleges her adversaries 
were none other than the Nigerian Government, in a concerted effort with 
Royal Dutch Petroleum (Shell), one of Nigeria’s largest oil producers. Mrs. 
Kiobel’s sole purpose for bringing the suit was to “hold . . . Shell 
responsible for the alleged crimes committed against [her and her family] 
and the rest of humanity.”1 
Mrs. Kiobel claims that Shell aided and abetted the Nigerian government 
in acts of terrorism and extrajudicial killings of Nigerian citizens including 
her husband, Dr. Barimen Kiobel.2 This Comment sheds light on the events 
which triggered Mrs. Kiobel’s suit, and discusses the available remedies to 
her and her family following the Supreme Court’s decision. 
In April 2013, the United States Supreme Court determined that 
corporations could only be held liable for human rights violations which 
“touch and concern” the territory of the United States with “sufficient 
force.”3 The case involved Nigerian citizens of the oil-rich Ogoniland in the 
Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.4 The Nigerian citizens brought suit against 
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insightful comments. I would also like to thank my parents, Chief Osita Ikegbunam 
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 1. John Donovan, Email Received from Esther Kiobel of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC.COM (Apr. 24, 2013), http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2013/04/24/ 
email-received-from-esther-kiobel-of-kiobel-v-royal-dutch-shell/.  
 2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013). 
 3. Id. at 1669.  
 4. Id. at 1662. 
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Shell, alleging its affiliates assisted the Nigerian government in committing 
violations against the Law of Nations in Nigeria.5 The unanimous Supreme 
Court decision has left much uncertainty regarding whether foreign 
individuals can bring alleged Law of Nations violations to United States 
district courts.6  
This Comment seeks to answer three questions brought forth by the 
Kiobel decision. Firstly, what does it mean to “touch and concern” the 
territory of the United States, and to do so with “sufficient force”? 
Secondly, do any viable remedies remain for Mrs. Kiobel against Shell, 
should she continue to seek relief? Finally, what precautions can be taken to 
prevent the events that led to this suit from occurring again?  
Part I of this Comment analyzes the Kiobel decision and offers a 
definition to Justice Kennedy’s “touch and concern” language. Part II 
suggests solutions to the Kiobel Petitioners, and explores the available 
remedies for suit under Nigerian domestic law, international law, the law of 
the Netherlands, and United Kingdom law. Finally, Part III of this 
Comment offers mechanisms to improve transparency between the Nigerian 
government and Nigerian citizens, especially those most affected by 
petroleum operations.  
I. Factual Background  
The twelve Kiobel Petitioners, led by Esther Kiobel, were citizens of 
Ogoniland, a 250-square-mile area located in the Niger delta of Nigeria.7 
Respondents, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and 
Trading Company, p.l.c., were incorporated in the Netherlands and 
England, respectively.8 The suit involved actions of a Shell affiliate, Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd. (SPDC), which is 
incorporated in Nigeria, and engages in oil exploration and production in 
Ogoniland.9  
The citizens in Ogoniland began to protest oil development of their land, 
particularly the adverse environmental effects of SPDC’s practices.10 At the 
forefront of the protests were outspoken playwrights and authors Dr. 
Barimen Kiobel and Ken Saro-Wira, as well as leaders of the “popular 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 7. Id. at 1662 (majority opinion). 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
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grassroots movement, known as the Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People (“MOSOP.”)”11 The Petitioners’ complaint alleged 
“throughout the early 1990’s, . . . [the] Nigerian military and police forces 
attacked Ogoni villages, beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents and 
destroying and looting property.”12 Both Dr. Kiobel and Ken Saro-Wira 
were killed by the Nigerian government for their roles in the MOSOP 
protests.13 
Mrs. Kiobel vividly recalls being “stripped naked, tortured, and locked 
up twice, while [her] husband and the rest of the Ogoni 9[14] were maimed, 
strangled, killed and acidized” by the Nigerian government.15 Her claims 
were corroborated by affidavits of key witnesses, including fellow protester 
Boniface Ejiogu.16 
The Petitioners were later granted political asylum in the United States.17 
Subsequently, they brought suit against the Respondents under the Alien 
Torts Statute, claiming violations of the Law of Nations. 
A. The Alien Torts Statute 
The Kiobel Petitioners sought relief under the Alien Torts Statute 
(ATS),18 which provides: “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations . . . .”19 Since its inception, the ATS has rarely been used and has 
been difficult for the courts to apply.20 The ATS was interpreted very 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 
10-1491). 
 12. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.  
 13. Memorandum from Nazareth M. Haysbert on the Current Scope of the Alien Tort 
Statute Post Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (2013) (on file with author).   
 14. Group of nine activists from the Ogoni region in Nigeria that included Ken Saro-
Wiwa, Saturday Dobee, Nordu Eawu, Daniel Gbooko, Paul Levera, Felix Naute, Baribor 
Bera, Barimen Kiobel, and John Kpuine, who were executed by hanging.  
 15. Donovan, supra note 1. 
 16. Letter from Esther Kiobel to Author (n.d.) (concerning statement written by Mr. 
Boniface Ejiogu) (on file with author). Ejiogu’s statement further described Esther’s 
detainment and also alleges among other accusations that he was promised “the sum of fifty 
million naira” to cease involvements in the Ogoni case.  Id. 
 17. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.  
 18. Id. at 1662. 
 19. Alien Torts Claims Acts, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  
 20. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (“[T]he ATS was invoked twice in the late 18th 
century, but then only once more over the next 167 years.”). 
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narrowly in early case law.21 Early courts limited the ATS to “‘three 
principle offenses against the law of nations’[:] . . . violation of safe 
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”22 
However, court interpretation of the ATS eventually broadened enough to 
give Mrs. Kiobel hope that the ATS would allow adjudication of her claim 
in a United States court. 
Filartiga v. Pena- Irala provided the courts with their first opportunity to 
interpret the reach of the ATS. In this case, the Second Circuit established 
that United States’ courts have “jurisdiction over claims brought by foreign 
plaintiffs for violations of the law of nations that occurred outside U.S. 
borders if the defendant was found and was provided a valid service of 
process in the U.S.”23 The Paraguayan plaintiffs in Filartiga filed suit in 
New York district court against a Paraguayan defendant,24 “a former 
government official of Paraguay,” who was accused of “kidnap[ping] and 
tortur[ing]” the plaintiff’s son to death.25 After allegedly killing the 
plaintiff’s son in Paraguay, the defendant entered the United States, where 
he was served process by the plaintiffs.26 The District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York initially dismissed the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.27  
In reversing the district court, the Second Circuit held that the tortious 
conduct of the defendant “constituted a violation of the [L]aw of 
[N]ations.”28 Filartiga also held that, “whenever an alleged torturer is found 
within the borders of the U.S., the ATS grants jurisdiction.”29 Although 
Filartiga was brought against an individual, it is said to have eventually 
“opened the floodgates”  for ATS litigation against corporations as well.30  
                                                                                                                 
 21. Yihe Yang, Corporate Civil Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: The Practical 
Implications from Kiobel, 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 196 (2013).  
 22.  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1661 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694 
(2004)).  
 23. Yang, supra note 21, at 197 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d 
Cir. 1980)). 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.   
 26. Id. (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878).   
 27. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.  
 28. Yang, supra note 21, at 197.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  
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Over twenty years later, the Ninth Circuit heard the first ATS case 
against a corporate defendant.31 In Doe v. Unocal, residents of Southeast 
Asia brought suit against Unocal Corporation, a subsidiary of Union Oil 
Company of California.32 The plaintiffs alleged Unocal aided and abetted 
the Myanmar Military in forcing them “under threat of violence[] to work 
on and serve as porters” for Unocal’s pipeline project.33 During this time, 
the Military subjected the plaintiffs to “acts of murder, rape, and torture.”34  
The district court determined that private corporations are subject to the 
ATS for human rights violations.35 Unocal was deemed liable under the 
ATS for subjecting the plaintiffs to rape and murder; however, they were 
not held liable for torture.36 The court based its determination on 
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, where the court held that “knowing practical 
assistance [or] encouragement . . . which has a substantial effect on the 
perpetration of the crime,” is a “standard for aiding and abetting . . . under 
the [ATS].”37 Doe was settled before the Ninth Circuit could fully 
adjudicate the dispute.38 Despite this, Doe is said to have paved the way for 
ATS litigation against multi-national corporations.39  
Two years after Doe, the Supreme Court, in Sosa v. United States, 
limited the use of the ATS before United States courts. In Sosa, the 
Supreme Court ruled the ATS did not permit private individuals to bring 
suit against foreign citizens in United States courts for crimes committed in 
other countries in violation of the Law of Nations.40 
Sosa was based on actions that took place in Mexico.41 The plaintiffs, the 
United States and Humberto Alvarez-Machain et. al, brought suit against 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), on reh’g en banc sub nom. 
John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 32. Id. at 937–38. 
 33. Id. at 939.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 36. Doe I, 395 F.3d at 955. Many of the plaintiff-appellant’s claims could amount to 
torture involving victims other than Plaintiffs. Because the plaintiff-appellants did not form a 
class action with victims, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Doe’s torture claims. Id.  
 37. Id. at 954 (quoting Prosecutor v. Furudzija, 38 I.L.M.  317 (1999) (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia, decision of Dec. 10, 1998), available at 1999 WL 363473)). 
 38. Id. at 953.   
 39. Yang, supra note 21, at 198 (citing Donald J. Kochan, The Political Economy of the 
Production of Customary International Law: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations 
in U.S. Courts, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 240, 242 (2004)).  
 40. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).   
 41. Id. at 697.  
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defendant, Jose Francisco Sosa, for violently abducting Alvarez-Machain 
who offered aid to Enrique Camarna-Salazar.42 Camarna-Salazar was an 
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration who was tortured and 
murdered by the Mexican government.43 It was alleged that “Sosa[] 
abducted Alvarez from his house, held him overnight in a motel, and 
brought him [on a] private plane to El Paso, Texas, where [Alvarez] was 
arrested . . . .”44 
Alvarez-Machain brought a false arrest claim against the United States 
under the Federal Torts Claim Act (FCTA) as well as an ATS claim against 
Sosa for violating the Law of Nations.45 The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of 
Alvarez-Machain, and Sosa appealed.46 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in favor of 
Alvarez-Machain, and held the ATS, “by its grant of jurisdiction, 
authorized the federal courts to recognize federal common law causes of 
action to redress violations of . . . international norms.”47 In addition to 
further defining the extent of grounds for ATS claims, Sosa served as the 
leading authority for the Kiobel decision.  
Although the preceding case law helped to clarify the ATS, the Supreme 
Court would later make its unprecedented determination in Kiobel, 
drastically limiting the applicability of the ATS. Before Kiobel, the 
requirements of bringing suit under the ATS could be simplified to: “(1) the 
plaintiff must be an ‘alien,’ (2) the defendant must have committed a ‘tort,’ 
and (3) the ‘tort’ must violate either a treaty, or the ‘law of nations.’”48 
The alien status requirement under the ATS was never at issue in ATS 
cases. An alien is someone who “relat[es], belong[s to], or ow[es] 
allegiance to another country or government.”49 The second and third 
elements of the ATS require the defendant to commit a tort in violation of a 
treaty or the Law of Nations.50 For a defendant to violate the Law of 
Nations, their offense must be “definable, obligatory, and universally 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.   
 44. Id. at 698. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 699. 
 47. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 
10-1491).  
 48. Yang, supra note 21, at 198 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2nd Cir. 
1995)).   
 49. Definition of Alien, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/alien (last visited May 10, 2014).  
 50. Yang, supra note 21, at 198.   
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condemned.”51 Initially, violations of the Law of Nations under the ATS 
was limited to “violation[s] of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy.”52 However, today courts have the discretion to 
interpret the ATS based on laws existing in the world today.53  
The issue of corporate liability under the ATS remains somewhat of a 
mystery. Doe allowed a claim to be brought against Unocal, a corporation.54 
The majority in Doe reasoned because Unocal knew or should have known 
its conduct would assist the Myanmar military in committing human rights 
violations, it should be held liable as a corporation.55 However, before the 
Ninth Circuit could make its determination, “the parties settled the case.”56 
Thus, Doe never formally addressed the issue of corporate liability. 
Because Sosa “dealt with claims against individual person . . . rather than a 
corporation,” prior to Kiobel, the Supreme Court had not had the 
opportunity to rule on corporate liability under the ATS.57  
Kiobel presented the Court with a unique question of determining 
corporate liability under the ATS.58 The Kiobel decision was important not 
only for its paramount determination on the ATS, but also for the important 
questions it raised for alien victims of human rights violations, corporate 
defendants, and foreign sovereigns alike. 
B. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
The Kiobel case brought about the first opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to rule on corporate liability under the ATS. Mrs. Kiobel and the 
other Petitioners “allege[d] that [the Shell companies] aided and abetted 
these atrocities by . . . providing the Nigerian forces with food, 
transportation, and compensation, as well as allowing the Nigerian military 
to use respondents’ property as a staging ground for attacks.”59 Documents 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. at 199 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980)).  
 52. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013) (quoting Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004). 
 53. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. 
 54. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), on reh’g en banc sub nom., 
John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 55. Id. at 946.  
 56. Yang, supra note 21, at 200.   
 57. Id. at 202.  
 58. Id.   
 59. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662–63 (2013). 
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in Mrs. Kiobel’s possession revealed an approval by SPDC to use violent 
force against protesters,60 and a request for arms.61 
Shortly after the alleged human rights violations, the Petitioners moved 
to the United States, were granted political asylum, and became legal 
United States residents.62 The Petitioners filed their suit in the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York.63 They brought their claim 
under the ATS, alleging: 
[R]espondents violated the law of nations by aiding and abetting 
the Nigerian Government in committing (1) extrajudicial 
killings; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) torture and cruel 
treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violations of the 
rights to life, liberty, security, and association; (6) forced exile; 
and (7) property destruction.64 
The first, fifth, sixth, and seventh claims were dismissed by the district 
court, because the claims did not violate the Law of Nations.65 The Second 
Circuit dismissed the complaint entirely, “reasoning that the law of nations 
does not recognize corporate liability.”66 The Second Circuit based its 
dismissal on the notion that “corporate liability under the ATS [was] an 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction,” and “placed great emphasis on . . . [a 
lack of] case law holding corporations accountable directly under 
international law for violations of international human rights norms . . . .”67  
The Petitioners appealed, arguing “the Second Circuit erred by treating 
the issue of corporate liability as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction,” 
and explained “[n]othing in the . . . ATS suggests that the drafters meant to 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Letter from the Managing Director, Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nig. Limited to the 
Inspector General of the Nigeria Police (n.d.) (stating that on July 27, 1994, “approval was 
given for [SPDC] to import some arms and ammunition for the use of Police Force to 
enhance the security of . . . oil installations.”). 
 61. Letter from the Managing Director, Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nig. Limited to the 
Inspector General of the Nigeria Police Force (Aug. 17, 1994) (requesting additional 
firearms and ammunition). 
 62. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 
(2013) (No. 10-1491). 
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exclude entities from the tort liability recognized in the statute.”68 The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 17, 2011.69 
The Kiobel decision hinged upon “whether and under what 
circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort 
Statute, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of 
a sovereign other than the United States.”70 Specifically, the question before 
the Court in Kiobel was “whether a claim may reach conduct occurring in 
the territory of a foreign sovereign,” not merely whether an ATS claim was 
properly asserted. 
The Court ultimately held in favor of Respondents, affirming the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals.71 In determining the applicability of the 
ATS to Law of Nations violations occurring outside of the United States, 
the Court, led by Justice Roberts, sought to determine the legislative intent 
of the ATS’s scope. The Court recognized the opaqueness of the statue 
which “does not expressly provide any causes of action.”72 However, it 
found the statute was not meant to be “stillborn,”73 but instead enacted to 
“provide a cause of action for [a] modest number of international law 
violations.”74  
In absence of any clear language granting jurisdiction to foreign 
petitioners for actions taking place outside of the United States, the Court 
relied upon the presumption against extraterritorial application.75 This 
canon of statutory interpretation provides “[w]hen a statute gives no clear 
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none . . . .”76 The 
presumption against extraterritoriality is often invoked whenever an act of 
Congress applies abroad.77 Thus, since the ATS does not provide any clear 
indication of its extraterritorial application, the Court reasoned it could not 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. at 8-9.  
 69. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, SCOTUS BLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2013). 
 70. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.  
 71. Id. at 1669.  
 72. Id. at 1663.   
 73. Id.   
 74. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004)).  
 75. Id. at 1664.  
 76. Id. (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 256 (2010)).  
 77. Id.; see, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246 (1991) (“These 
cases present the issue whether Title VII applies extraterritoriality to regulate the 
employment practices of United States employers who employ United States citizens 
abroad.”); Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254 (noting that the question of extraterritorial application 
was a “merits question,” not a question of jurisdiction).  
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be used to grant jurisdiction to the petitioner’s claims, which took place in 
Nigeria.  
Petitioners argued that even if the presumption applied, “Congress . . . 
[could] indicate that it intends federal law to apply to conduct occurring 
abroad.”78 Petitioners further contended, “because Congress surely intended 
the ATS to provide jurisdiction for actions against pirates, it necessarily 
anticipated the statute would apply to conduct occurring abroad.”79 
However, the Supreme Court countered, finding neither any evidence 
within the text or historical background of the ATS to displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.”80 The Supreme Court also rejected 
the Petitioners’ argument that the ATS’ application to piracy is evidence of 
its extraterritorial intent. The majority reasoned that applying the US law to 
pirates “does not typically impose the sovereign will of the United States 
onto conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another 
sovereign.”81 This reason was consistent with the ATS’s policy of not 
infringing on the rights of other nations.82 Thus, despite the Petitioners’ 
arguments, the Court held the canon against extraterritoriality applied.83 
For cases after Kiobel, any claim brought under the ATS can only be 
brought in United States courts if they “touch and concern the territory of 
the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritorial application.”84 This requirement is arguably the most 
controversial language of the opinion. Kiobel’s holding begs the questions 
of what “touch and concern” means, and what constitutes sufficient force. 
Justice Kennedy admits the Court’s decision left “open a number of 
significant questions” pertaining to the reach and interpretation of the Alien 
Torts Statute.85  
Both Justice Alito and Justice Breyer attempted to answer these 
questions in their concurring opinions. Justice Alito’s concurrence suggests 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2012) (providing 
jurisdiction over the offense of genocide “regardless of where the offense is committed” if 
the alleged offender is, among other things, “present in the United States”).  
 79. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667.  
 80. Id. at 1666; see Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265 (noting that “[a]ssuredly contact can be 
consulted” in determining whether a cause of action applies abroad).  
 81. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667. 
 82. Id. at 1664; see Morrison, 561 U.S. at 256; Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 
U.S. 437, 454 (2007) (“[T]he presumption that the United States law governs domestically 
but does not rule the world applies . . . .”).  
 83. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.  
 84. Id.   
 85. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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that ATS causes of action should only fall outside the scope of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality when the action (1) meets “Sosa’s 
requirements of definiteness and acceptance” and (2) actually occurs within 
the United States.86  
Justice Breyer concurred with the Court’s conclusion, but not its 
reasoning.87 He proposed that instead of using the presumption against 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the ATS should apply in three specific 
instances: “where (1) the alleged tort occurred on American soil, (2) the 
defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct 
substantially and adversely affects an important American national 
interest . . . .”88 
Despite the efforts of the concurring opinions, the Kiobel decision left 
many important questions unresolved. The following sections of this 
Comment discusses the Supreme Court and district court’s application of 
Kiobel.     
C. Supreme Court Treatment of ATS Claims Post-Kiobel    
After the Supreme Court’s decision, Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit had the first opportunity to apply the “touch and concern” language 
of Kiobel. On the same day as the Kiobel  decision, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in the Ninth Circuit case, Daimler AG v. Bauman.89 
Daimler addressed the issue of whether personal jurisdiction could be 
exercised over a foreign corporation solely because its domestic subsidiary 
maintained  continous activities within the forum state.90  
The petitioners in Daimler brought a claim under the ATS, alleging that 
one of Daimler Chrysler’s subsidiaries, Mercedes Benz Argentina, aided 
and abetted Argentinian security forces in Argentina’s Dirty War by 
torturing, killing, kidnapping, and detaining the petitioners and their 
relatives.91 The appellate court dismissed the claim for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.92 The Supreme Court ultimately held that the petitioners’ claim 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. at 1670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 87. Id. at 1670–71 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 88. Id. at 1671. 
 89. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 917 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d sub 
nom. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).  
 90. Id.   
 91. Id. at 911. 
 92. Id. at 917.  
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was improperly brought under the ATS, and could not serve as a valid basis 
for personal jurisdiction.93 
Again on the same day as Kiobel, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling in Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei. The Ninth Circuit permitted 
corporate liability under the ATS, and found Rio Tinto could be sued under 
the ATS for human rights abuses and thousands of deaths linked to 
pollution cause by the company’s copper and gold mines in Papua New 
Guinea.94 The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for additional 
rulings in light of the Court’s decision in Kiobel.95  
D. District Courts’ Application of Kiobel 
The district courts also moved to rule in light of the Kiobel decision. 
Most of the litigation in district courts has involved human rights violations 
taking place entirely abroad.96 In these instances, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has prevented plaintiffs from bringing suit.97 Conversely, 
district courts have allowed claims brought under the ATS for claims with 
strong enough connections to “touch and concern” the United States with 
sufficient force.  
In Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, the district court determined that 
Kiobel’s “touch and concern . . . with sufficient force” requirement was 
satisfied by the defendants actions, which took place in the United States.98 
The defendant was charged with planning and managing a campaign of 
repression in Uganda from his Massachusetts residence.99 The district court 
for Massachusetts applied the ATS by distinguishing Kiobel in two ways. 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 750.  
 94. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated sub nom. Rio Tinto, PLC v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (U.S. 2013). 
 95. Rio Tinto PLC, 133 S. Ct. at 1995. 
 96. Fotso v. Republic of Cameroon, No. 6:12 CV 1215-TC, 2013 WL 3006338, at *7 
(D. Or. June 11, 2013) (dismissing Plaintiff’s ATS claims for lack of jurisdiction in less than 
a paragraph based on the presumption against extraterritoriality enforced in Kiobel).  
 97. See Al Shimari v. CACI Intern, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Va. 2013) (holding 
that the court lacked jurisdiction over claims by four Iraqi citizens against private security 
company CACI Premier Technologies, because the acts giving rise to Plaintiff’s injuries 
occurred exclusively on foreign soil and outside the territory of the United States); see also 
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013) (dismissing plaintiff’s ATS claim that 
alleged that South African subsidiaries of three U.S.-based companies, Ford, IBM, and 
DaimlerChrysler, aided and abetted the apartheid government of South Africa in acts of 
rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings against South African citizens because the actions 
took place in another sovereign).  
 98. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322 (D. Mass. 2013).  
 99. Id. at 309.  
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Firstly, the defendant’s conduct in Sexual Minorities Uganda was carried 
out by an American citizen.100 Secondly, although the harm endured by the 
plaintiffs occurred in Uganda, nearly all of the defendant’s conduct took 
place in the United States.101 Consequently, the claims in Sexual Minorities 
Uganda were properly brought under the ATS and “touched and concerned 
the territory of the United States” with enough force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.  
Given the response from the Supreme Court and district courts following 
Kiobel, it appears that United States courts are moving towards restricting 
extraterritorial application of human rights claims under the ATS.  
E. Defining What It Means to “Touch and Concern” with “Sufficient 
Force” 
As of yet, the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to clearly 
define what it means to “touch and concern” the territory of the United 
States with “sufficient force.”102 This portion of the Comment speculates as 
to which claims would succeed under the ATS after Kiobel. Specifically, it 
addresses (1) whether conduct occurring outside of the United States can 
“touch” the United States; (2) whether the actions of a foreign subsidiary of 
a United States corporation can satisfy the “touch” requirement of Kiobel; 
(3) the type of conduct that could “concern” the United States, and (4) what 
conduct constitutes “sufficient force.”  
1. Absent a Clear Indication of Extraterritoriality, Can the ATS Apply To 
Conduct Occurring Outside the United States? 
The concurring opinions in Kiobel read a requirement of conduct 
occurring within the territory of the United States into the “touch and 
concern with sufficient force” language.103 Presumably, this interpretation 
is consistent with the majority’s analysis of the intentions of the ATS. The 
majority reasoned the fact the ATS applies to aliens does not make its 
application automatically extraterritorial.104 Further, the majority opined the 
petitioners were incorrect to contend that the “text, history, and purposes of 
the ATS rebut” the presumption against extraterritoriality.105  
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 321.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).  
 103. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 104. Id. at 1665 (majority opinion). 
 105. Id.   
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However, just six years after the enactment of the ATS, an opinion by 
Attorney General William Bradford applied the ATS to a violation of the 
Law of Nations that occurred in Sierra Leone.106 Bradford noted:  
[T]here can be no doubt that the company or individuals who 
have been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a 
civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being 
expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues 
for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of 
the United States . . . .107 
Bradford’s statements give a very clear indication that the ATS could  
apply extraterritorially. Thus, the text and history of the ATS does not 
clearly provide that conduct must occur within the territory of the United 
States for jurisdictional relief.  
Bradford’s statements provide support that the text and history of the 
ATS does in at least one instance rebut the presumption against 
extraterritorality. Thus, even without any clear indication of extraterritorial 
intent, the text and history of the ATS support its application to conduct 
occurring outside the United States.  
2. Can the Actions of a Foreign Subsidiary of a United States 
Corporation “Touch” the Territory of the United States? 
The requirement of “touching” the territory of the United States could be 
purely jurisdictional. Kiobel has taught us that the ATS will not support a 
claim against a company merely because an entity of the company exists in 
the United States. Subsidiaries of transnational oil company, such as SPDC, 
are only subject to United States’ authority to the extent that its actions can 
be attributed to the parent corporation as a whole. Many multinational oil 
companies, including Shell, have been carefully crafted with multiple 
subsidiaries, holding companies, and other entities “designed to minimize 
accountability and liability for the impact of operations . . . .”108 As a result, 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Beth Stephens, Extraterritoriality and Human Rights After Kiobel, 28 MD. J. INT'L 
L. 256, 268 (2013), available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol28/iss1/ 
13; Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1795). For an extensive discussion of the 
Bradford opinion, including contemporaneous documents confirming that Bradford knew 
that the events had occurred in the territory of a foreign state, see Supplemental Brief of 
Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History et al. in Support of Petitioners at 18–25, Kiobel, 
133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
 107. Stephens, supra note 106, at 268–69 (quoting Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y 
Gen. at 59). 
 108. Id. at 260.  
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a conjectural ATS case that adequately “touched” the United States would 
likely involve a foreign corporation with a corporate structure that can 
easily be traced to the United States. However, after the 2014 Daimler 
decision, it is doubtful personal jurisdiction could be obtained over a multi-
national corporation with actions closely tying it to a United States 
corporation, even if the claim was brought successfully under the ATS.  
3. What Type of Conduct “Concerns” the Territory of the United States? 
With respect to the majority’s analysis on the history of the ATS, it is 
troubling to decipher which human rights violations “concern” the United 
States. This could imply certain human rights violations are not important 
enough to be heard in United States courts. By the broadest translation, any 
human rights violation could concern the United States. Certain 
comparative law theorists contend that violations of human rights by their 
very nature are extraterritorial.109 International law prohibits human rights 
violation regardless of where the conduct occurs.110 Universal norms have 
no geographical limitations.111  
Another broad reading of “concern” could be to interpret it as an effect 
on the moral compass of the United States. When the United States was 
first alerted of the abuses in Ogoniland, the Congressional Human Rights 
Caucus wrote to Nigeria’s Head of State and Commander In Chief General 
Sani Abacha. In the letter dated May 6, 1994, United States Chairman Tom 
Lantos urged the Nigerian government to “protect the fundamental rights 
of . . . the Ogoni people.”112 Under the moral definition of concern, it is 
clear that Kiobel “concerned” the United States.  
Under a more narrow interpretation of “concern,” a cause of action 
would need strong enough ties to the United States without infringing on 
the sovereignty of the jurisdiction in which the offenses took place. 
Hypothetically, a case in which American citizens working abroad in a 
United States embassy or a similar agency committed human rights 
violations against foreigners could “concern” the United States. However 
the facts in Kiobel make the “concern” language even more troubling. If 
actions which took place in Nigeria, a country which has been one of the 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id. at 258 (“[U]niversal human rights . . . are ‘extraterritorial’ by definition.”).  
 110. Id. (listing genocide, slavery, and torture by name rather than human rights 
violations generally).  
 111. Id.  
 112. Letter to General Sani Abacha from Congress, provided by Esther Kiobel to author 
(n.d.) (on file with author).  
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United States’ top five oil producers,113 involving Shell, a company which 
has a strong presence in the United States, did not “concern” the United 
States, it is difficult to imagine what could.  
4. “With Sufficient Force”: The “Catch All” Provision of the Kiobel 
Requirements 
The “sufficient force” language appears to place another barrier on 
claims brought under the ATS which clear the hurdles of “touching” and 
“concerning” the United States. Hypothetically, an incident which violates 
human rights norms and is considered to touch and concern the territory of 
the United States could still fall short of Kiobel’s requirements. The 
“sufficient force” language of the Kiobel decision is arguably the most 
challenging. Future ATS cases will have to set the scopes and bounds of 
when a claim which touches and concerns the United States does so with 
sufficient force and when one does not.   
Part I of this Comment’s analysis was strictly confined to the immediate 
ramifications of the Kiobel decision. It offered an answer to what it means 
to “touch and concern” and to do so with “sufficient force.” The questions 
raised by Kiobel beg the bigger question on the state of human rights 
violations under the ATS after Kiobel’s ruling. The concurring opinions 
indicate to “touch and concern with sufficient force” requires actions to 
take place in the United States. However theoretically there are a number of 
scenarios in which actions occurring abroad meet Kiobel’s requirements 
under the ATS. The scenarios offered above are of course mere conjecture. 
In truth, only time will tell if the Supreme Court will expand or restrict the 
scope of the ATS.  
II. Possible Avenues for Remedy 
The door to corporate liability for Shell Petroleum Development 
Company’s actions has been tightly shut under the ATS. Despite this, 
several avenues for relief for the Kiobel Petitioners and/or for holding Shell 
accountable may still exist. Recall that the actions in Kiobel took place in 
Nigeria, the Petitioners soon after moved to the United States, and that 
Shell is incorporated in the United Kingdom and headquartered in the 
Netherlands.114 In addition to bringing suit in the United States, the Kiobel 
Petitioners had the opportunity to bring suit in Nigeria, the Netherlands, and 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Shell at a Glance, SHELL.COM, http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/at-a-glance. 
html (last visited May 10, 2014). 
 114. Id. 
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the United Kingdom. This section explores all of the possible avenues for 
holding Shell and similarly situated multi-national companies liable for 
human rights violations.  
A. Domestic Relief in Nigeria   
[T]here is adequate evidence [to] expose Shell Petroleum 
Development Company’s evil collaboration with Nigerian 
government, which invariably poses legitimate and explainable 
fear that if ever the case is referred to Nigeria, the oil giant will 
be exonerated. 
 . . . It would discredit the United States Supreme Court’s 
judgmental competence if this case is referred to Nigeria, 
because even a child in the crèche knows that you cannot ask an 
abuser to be his or her own judge. 
 –Esther Kiobel on relief under Nigerian law115 
The Nigerian government itself allegedly carried out the heinous acts 
against the Kiobel Petitioners,116 this likely created significant doubt in the 
viability of relief in Nigerian courts.117 The Nigerian government showed a 
strong interest in resolving the dispute at home. Upon the Petitioner’s grant 
of jurisdiction in the United States, the Nigerian government expressed to 
the U.S. Attorney General that  
the suit would improperly assert “extra territorial jurisdiction of 
a United States court . . . for events which took place in 
Nigeria;” “jeopardize the on-going process initiated by the 
current government to reconcile with the Ogoni people in 
Nigeria;” “compromise the serious efforts by the Nigerian 
Government to guarantee the safety of foreign investments, 
including those of the United States;” and “gravely undermine 
[Nigeria’s] sovereignty and place under strain the cordial 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Esther Kiobel, Dr. Kiobel’s Widow: A Living Story of Shell Cruelty, OGONI-NIGER 
DELTA NEWS, Sept. 17, 2012, http://news.huraclub.org/2012/09/17/dr-koibels-widow-living-
story-shells-cruelty-2/.  
 116. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013).  
 117. See cases cited infra note 132.  
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relations that exist with the Government of the United States of 
America.”118  
Considering the breadth of legal remedies for tortious conduct, 
environmental damages, and human rights violations available under 
Nigerian law alone, the Kiobel Petitioners may have been able to receive 
justice in their own backyard. 
Nigerian law provides relief for tortious conduct between Nigerian 
citizens and multinational companies such as Shell.119 The Kiobel 
Petitioners sought redress for numerous claims that could give rise to tort 
liability under Nigerian law, including “arbitrary detention,” which could 
give rise to a false imprisonment claim, “burning, destroying or looting 
property,” which equates to trespass by chattels claims, and “beat[ing], and 
flog[ing]” Petitioners, which could lead to assault and battery claims.120 If 
these claims were successfully brought in a court in Nigeria, the Nigerian 
Petitioners could receive “monetary compensation for damages or an 
injunction” against the defendants.121 In addition to this, the parties could 
have opted to settle the dispute privately.122  
Nigerian courts also offer prohibitory injunctions. An order granting 
prohibitory injunctive relief would prevent Shell from acting in a way that 
would further harm the Petitioners. However, It is unlikely that the Kiobel 
Petitioners (or similarly situated plaintiffs) would be granted injunctive 
relief against Shell. Nigerian courts do not typically grant injunctive relief 
against multinational oil companies.123 Instead, Nigerian courts have chosen 
to forego injunctive relief against oil companies drilling in indigenous 
communities to prevent “disturb[ing] the oil industry which is the main 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Jonathan S. Massey, The Two That Got Away: First American Financial Corp. v. 
Edwards and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 63, 83 (2012) 
(quoting Joint Appendix at 129, 130, 131, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 
1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491)). 
 119. OLUFEMI AMAO, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
LAW: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 141 (2011).  
 120. Amended Class Action Complaint at 6, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 
S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).  
 121. AMAO, supra note 119, at 129.   
 122. For example, Shell settled a similar case with the Ogoni people for numerous 
tortious and human rights violations including the killing of activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. Ed 
Pilkington, Shell Pays Out $15.5m over Saro-Wiwa Killing, GUARDIAN, June 8, 2009, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/nigeria-usa. 
 123. Jedrzej George Frynas, Legal Change in Africa: Evidence from Oil-Related 
Litigation in Nigeria, 43 J. AFR. L. 121, 122 (1999).  
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source of the country’s revenue.”124 However, Nigerian courts have granted 
injunctive relief where companies have violated human rights under the 
African Charter and other international law.125  
The claims against Shell could also be brought under a theory of 
negligence under Nigerian tort law. To sustain an action for negligence, the 
Petitioners would have to show that the defendants (1) owed them a duty of 
care, (2) breached that duty of care, and (3) the breach caused the 
Petitioners’ injuries.126 
In cases regarding multinational companies and indigenous populations, 
the biggest challenge faced by a plaintiff is showing that the defendant 
acted negligently, or did not act as a reasonable operator under the 
circumstances. The Kiobel Petitioners could prove this element through two 
angles. First, they could compare Shell’s operations in Ogoniland to other 
operators in Nigeria; however, doing so would likely produce favorable 
results for Shell. Unfortunately, the torts alleged here, which amount to 
destruction of property and nuisance in the Nigerian community, are 
commonplace practice by operators in Nigeria. Several multinational oil 
companies drilling in Nigeria have also been subject to suit by indigenous 
populations.127 Thus, it would be difficult to establish Shell’s practices in 
Ogoniland are unreasonable compared to the practices of other operators in 
Nigeria. Consequently, a negligence claim rooted in such a comparison is 
unlikely to prevail.  
Secondly, the Kiobel Petitioners could attempt to establish the 
unreasonableness of Shell’s operations in Nigeria by contrasting Shell’s 
operating practices in in Ogoniland to its operations in other countries. In 
order to do this, the Kiobel Petitioners would first be tasked with 
establishing that the comparison country is similarly situated to Ogoniland. 
A non-exhaustive list of factors to be weighed into this comparison would 
                                                                                                                 
 124. AMAO, supra note 119, at 130; see Irou v. Shell-BP, Unreported Suit No. W/89/71 
(Warri High Ct. Nov. 26, 1973) (Nigeria) (plaintiff whose land, fish pond and creek had 
polluted by Shell-BP operations was denied injunctive relief to restrain the company from 
further pollution); see also Chinda v. Shell-BP, [1974] 2 RSLR 1 (Nigeria) (denying plaintiff 
injunctive relief for illegal gas flaring against Shell-BP.)  
 125. AMAO, supra note 119, at 140; see Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nigeria, 
Ltd., No. FHC/B/CS/53/05 (F.H.C. Nov. 14, 2005) (Nigeria) (granting injunctive relief 
against plaintiff where court found that failure to grant relief would violate fundamental 
human rights and international standards).  
 126. See Jill Cottrell, The Tort of Negligence in Nigeria, 17 J. AFR. L. 30 (1973) 
(implying that Nigeria follows the traditional common law elements of negligence). 
 127. See Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010); Wiwa 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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include: socioeconomic status, topical similarities, comparable natural 
resources, etc.   
A claim of negligence could also be brought under the doctrine of res 
ipsa locquitor, Latin for “the thing speaks for itself."128 When this type of 
negligence is alleged, the plaintiff need not show any lack of due care on 
the part of the defendant, but instead must show that the fact the accident 
occurred alone constitutes negligence for which the defendant is strictly 
liable.129 Nigerian courts have found for plaintiffs, holding Shell-BP liable 
in res ipsa locquitor negligence cases involving environmental damage.130 
Thus, the Kiobel Petitioners could have remedies in the form of settlement, 
monetary damages, or injunctive relief for a variety of tortious theories, 
including ordinary negligence and strict liability.131  
B. Avenues for Relief in Nigeria Based on Nigerian and International 
Human Rights Law  
Nigerian human rights law also provides a viable avenue for holding 
Shell accountable for their violations against the Kiobel Petitioners. In the 
landmark decision of Gbemere v. Shell, the plaintiffs claimed 
oil exploration and production activities of Shell which led to 
incessant gas flaring . . . violated their right to life and dignity of 
the human person under sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the 
[Nigerian] Constitution, and articles 4, 16, and 24 of the African 
Charter [on Human and People’s Rights].132 
The plaintiffs in Gbemere were successful in their suit against Shell 
Nigeria, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, and the attorney 
general of the federation “under the fundamental rights enforcement 
                                                                                                                 
 128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. a (1965).   
 129. Id. § 328D cmt. e. 
 130. AMAO, supra note 119, at 130 (citing Mons v. Shell-BP, [1970-1972] 1 RSLR 71 
(Nigeria)).   
 131. While this section only explored a few remedies under Nigerian tort law. Claimants 
have also had success against multi-national oil companies for violations under the Rule in 
Rylands v. Fletcher. See Umudje v. Shell-BP, [1975] 9-11 SC 155 (Nigeria) (holding that 
Rylands v. Fletcher applies where the plaintiffs claim that materials from Shell’s waste pit 
escaped unto the plaintiff’s farms, ponds, and lakes). But see Shell Petroleum Dev. Corp. 
(Nig) Ltd. v. Amaro, [2000] 10 NWLR 248 (C.A.) (Nigeria) (finding the defendants are not 
liable under Rylands v. Fletcher because the establishment of a crude oil pipeline on land 
with potential of escape or spill was not a natural use of the land).   
 132. AMAO, supra note 119, at 139 (citing Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nigeria, 
Ltd., No. FHC/B/CS/53/05 (F.H.C. Nov. 14, 2005) (Nigeria)).  
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procedure in the Nigerian Constitution . . . .”133 The Nigerian federal high 
court held the Nigerian Constitution protects the “rights to clean, poison-
free, pollution-free environment.”134  
Gbemere confirms that claims can be brought under the African Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights where no such claim exists under Nigerian 
national law.135 The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights is one 
of multiple international human rights law provision that provide another 
avenue for relief for the Kiobel Petitioners. 
 Nigeria is currently a member of various international treatises including 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment; and the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights.136 As a member to these organizations, Nigeria is subject to 
sanctions for human rights violations, which provides another avenue of 
relief for the Kiobel Petitioners and for similarly situated plaintiffs. In 
addition to this, as Gbemere implies, Nigerian courts have a greater 
incentive to enforce fundamental rights when a plaintiff’s claims violate 
both domestic law and an international treatise.  
Should the Kiobel Petitioners seek redress in Nigerian courts, their 
claims would have the greatest force if coupled with a claim under the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. “Nigeria has ratified nine 
of the 13 core current international human rights treatises in force . . . .” 137 
However, Nigeria has failed to ratify necessary provisions to give make 
give these treatises full effectiveness.138  
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights provides many 
relevant provisions to the claims of the Kiobel Petitioners, including Article 
5, which protects human dignity by preventing “[a]ll forms of exploitation 
and degradation particularly . . . torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading . . . 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 140.  
 136. Id. at 136–37.  
 137. Id. at 136.  
 138. Id. For example, 
Nigeria has not signed the optional protocol on the Convention against Torture 
(2002) and does not recognize the competence of the Committee against 
Torture to receive communications from individuals under article 22 of the 
convention. Also, Nigeria has not taken its reporting obligations under the 
treaties seriously. Its reports have been few and far between. 
Id. (citing Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Nigeria 16/09/95, UN Doc. A/51/40, para. 42 (1997)).  
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treatment . . . .”139 Article 21 provides “[i]n case of spoliation the 
dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its 
property as well as to an adequate compensation.”140 Article 21 also ensures 
Nigerian citizens protection against foreign companies such as Shell, 
prescribing that “States parties to the present Charter shall undertake to 
eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation . . . so as to enable 
their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their 
national resources.”141 
The African Charter has been formally incorporated into the Nigerian 
domestic law,142 and “can be enforced through the procedure provided 
under the Nigerian Constitution.”143 However, the text of the Charter 
provides its own sanctions for any provisional breaches. Article 47 requires 
all participating states to report any actions, which may violate the 
Charter’s provisions.144 If the violating parties do not reconcile their actions 
within a certain time frame, the Charter will make a formal report of the 
finding, subjecting the violating nation to international scrutiny.145  
The Nigerian government might also be subject to accountability under 
the International Labour Organisation’s Convention 169 (ILO 169). The 
International Labour Organisation is a specialized agency of the UN and 
sets international standards by adopting conventions, recommendations, and 
strategies for their implementation.146 The provisions of ILO 169 are unique 
in that they promote the advancement and protection of indigenous 
populations.147 It stipulates, “wherever possible[;]148 [indigenous groups] 
                                                                                                                 
 139. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFRICA COMM’N ON HUMAN & 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, art. 5, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ (last visited May 10, 
2014).  
 140. Id. at art. 21.  
 141. Id.  
 142. AMAO, supra note 119, at 137 (citing 21 I.L.M. 58 (1981)). 
 143. Id. (quoting Garba v. Lagos State Attorney Gen., Suit ID/599m/91 (Oct. 31, 1991) 
(Nigeria), and Agbakoba v. Director State Sec. Servs., [1994] 6 NWLR (Pt 351) 475 
(Nigeria)).  
 144. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 139, at art. 47. 
 145. Id. at art. 52.  
 146. See, e.g., BRIGITTE FEIRING, INT’L LABOUR ORG., INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES’ 
RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO ILO CONVENTION NO. 169 (2009), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms 
_106474.pdf.  
 147. The ILO is designed to protect the rights of indigenous people groups such as the 
Ogonis by “stimulat[ing] a dialogue between governments and indigenous and tribal 
peoples.” Convention No. 169, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conven 
tions/no169/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).  
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shall participate in the benefit of . . . [resource exploitation] and receive a 
fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of 
such activities.”149 Thus, once ratified, the provisions of ILO 169 provide a 
means to further pressure the Nigerian government to protect the rights of 
indigenous people, as well as allow for compensation for damages of the 
exploration activities.150 
C. Avenues for Relief in Nigeria on Environmental Law Violations  
The Kiobel petition lacked detail of the environmental damage suffered 
as a result of Shell’s operations.151 However, petroleum exploitation in the 
Niger Delta (where Ogoniland is located) has greatly degraded the 
community’s environment.152 When oil is produced through improper 
methods, “forests are destroyed . . . leading to deforestation, noise 
pollution, threat to marine life, erosion and loss of vegetation and 
biodiversity.”153 In addition, oil production causes “air pollution, pipeline 
leakages, operational and accidental spills from well blow-outs, gas flaring, 
and venting, [which] result in harmful consequences on the people’s health, 
environment, infrastructural development and socio-economic 
livelihood.”154 As a result, Nigeria has enacted legislation to regulate the 
                                                                                                                 
 148. The “wherever possible” language of the provision may greatly limit the 
effectiveness of ILO 169. This language “casts a sore point on this right as it could serve as 
an alibi for government to renege on its responsibilities.”  ADEBOLA OGUNLADE, PETROLEUM 
EXPLOITATION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ (IP) RIGHTS IN NIGERIA: CAN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR ORGANISATION (ILO) CONVENTION 169 HELP? at 20 (2010).  
 149. Id. 
 150. Nigeria has been a member of the ILO since 1969, but only enforces thirty-four of 
the thirty-eight provisions that it ratified. Id. at 21.  
 151. The petitioners did originally make a claim for destruction of property.  See Kiobel 
vs. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., No. 02 Cir. 7618, 2004 WL 5719589, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 31, 2004). 
 152. OGUNLADE, supra note 148, at 1. 
 153. Id. In a Shell Internal Position Paper, it was reported that 56.4km2 of mangrove 
forest had been destroyed by Shell in Rivers State of Nigeria during seismic operations in 
1995. See J.P. Van Dessel, The Environmental Situation in the Niger Delta 15 (Feb. 1995) 
(internal position paper); see also Shell-BP v. Usoro [1960] SCNLR 121 (Nigeria); 
Seismograph Serv. v. Mark, [1993] 7 NWLR (Pt 304) 203 (Nigeria).  
 154. OGUNLADE, supra note 148, at 1-2. “Recently, it was reported that coastal 
communities near the Qua Iboe Oil Export Terminal operated by ExxonMobil experienced spill 
incidents recurrently on December 4, 2009; March 24, 2010 and May 1, 2010.” Id. at 1 n.4 
(citing SaharaReporters, New York, ExxonMobil Oil Spill in Niger Delta Exposes Nigerians to 
Poisoned Fish, SAHARA REPORTERS, June 9, 2010, https://web.archive.org/web/2010061604 
0246/http://saharareporters.com/real-news/sr-headlines/6244-exxonmobil-oil-spill-in-niger-del 
ta-exposes-nigerians-to-poisoned-fish.html). “A World Bank Report stated that about 2,300m3 
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drilling of multinational oil companies. For example, the Petroleum Act of 
1969 require “oil licensees or lessees . . . [to] adopt all possible precautions 
to prevent pollution and where it occurs or has occurred . . . take prompt 
steps to control [it] and if possible end it.”155  
In addition, Nigeria’s Associated Gas Re-injection Act of 1979 was 
enacted to ban gas flaring.156 The act provides for strict penalties on oil 
companies that fail to comply with its provisions.157 Unfortunately, there 
have been several delays in the ratification of this provision, making its 
enforcement impractical158 Once the act is in full effect, corporations such 
as Shell will suffer penalties for gas flaring. Regardless of their 
imperfections, provisions such as the Petroleum Act of 1969 and the Gas 
Re-injection Act serve as additional means to hold multinational oil 
companies accountable for environmental destruction under Nigerian 
law.159  
In sum, Nigerian law provides several modes of redress for the 
Petitioners ranging from tort damages to sanctions under international law. 
For relief under Nigerian tort law, Gbereme illustrates Nigerian courts have 
are willing to offer injunctive relief when citizens’ human rights have been 
violated. Despite the existence of these remedies, relief under Nigerian law 
may have greater viability in theory than in practice. The impracticability of 
relief under Nigerian law is confirmed by Nigeria’s failure to ratify multiple 
provisions of domestic and international law. Further, as Mrs. Kiobel 
predicted, many remedies in Nigeria may also fail to actuate in cases such 
as Kiobel where the government itself played a role in the offenses.  
  
                                                                                                                 
of oil in about 300 oil spill incidents were recorded in Nigeria annually between 1991 and 1993 
in Rivers and Delta States.” Id. (citing 1 WORLD BANK, DEFINING AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR THE NIGER DELTA 49 (1995); 2 id. tbl. A.12, at 95; Shell v. 
Farrah [1995] 3 NWLR (Pt 382) 148 (Nigeria)).  
 155. Id. at 12.  
 156. Associated Gas Re-Injection Act (1984) Cap. A2 LFN 2004.  
 157. OGUNLADE, supra note 148, at 12.  
 158. Id. Enactment dates include: Jan. 1, 1985; Jan. 1, 2004; Dec. 31, 2012.  
 159. Similar provisions include: (1) the Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act of 
1988, which was established to “centrally administer a national environmental policy in 
Nigeria. . . . [that] advocates the adoption of mechanisms to . . . prescribe operational 
standards aimed at eliminating or minimizing adverse environmental effects of mineral and 
oil development.” Id. at 13 (citing Federal Environmental Protection Amendment Decree 
No. (59) (1992) ch. 4.11, 4.14 (Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 68, Vol. 
79, 23 December, 1992)), and (2) the Environmental Impact Assessment Decree of 1992. 
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D. A Gleam of Hope: Avenues for Relief Under the Law of the Netherlands  
The Kiobel Petitioners could also seek relief under the Law of the 
Netherlands. Royal Dutch Shell is incorporated in the United Kingdom, and 
is headquartered in the Netherlands.160 According to Kiobel, “the 
defendants and representatives of the Nigerian government met in the 
Netherlands in February 1993 to formulate a plan to restore the peace 
necessary for defendants to resume their operations.”161 This instance alone 
may be enough to link the defendants’ actions to the Netherlands. Even if 
this is not the case, the Netherlands courts might be hospitable to Mrs. 
Kiobel’s claims.  
Dutch courts appear to be more favorable to cases against Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), for actions that took place in 
Nigeria. In 2013, the Hague District Court in the Netherlands issued a 
judgment against SPDC for environmental damages as a result of SPDC’s 
activities in Orobiri Village, Delta State, Nigeria.162 Plaintiff Freddy Akpan 
brought suit after SPDC’s oil spill “damaged 47 fishing ponds, killed all the 
fish and rendered the ponds useless.”163 This ruling is said to have opened 
“new avenues” for Nigerian plaintiffs against SPDC, and can offer much 
hope to the Kiobel Petitioners.164 The ruling in Akpan’s case not only 
“examin[ed] the role of the parent company, but also looked ‘at abuses 
committed by Shell Nigeria, where the link with the Netherlands is 
extremely limited’”.165 
Legal provisions in the Netherlands prove to extend additional modes of 
relief for the Kiobel Petitioners. The Law of the Netherlands recognizes 
criminal liability for any offense in principle; “its liability is therefore no 
longer restricted to the class of “economic offences.”166 The Dutch Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Shell at a Glance, supra note 113. 
 161. Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 120, at 17. 
 162. Ivana Sekularac & Anthony Deutsch, Dutch Court Says Shell Responsible for 
Nigeria Spills, REUTERS, Jan. 30, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/30/uk-shell-
nigeria-lawsuit-idUKBRE90T0DC20130130. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. (quoting Menno Kamminga, Professor of International Law at Maastricht 
University) (“The fact that a subsidiary has been held responsible by a Dutch court is new 
and opens new avenues . . . .”); id. (paraphrasing Geert Ritsema, Friends of the Earth 
spokesman) (“Ritsema said hundreds of other Nigerians in the village of Icot Ada Udo, 
where Farmer Friday Akpan lives, can now take similar legal action.”).  
 165. Id.  
 166. B.F. Keulen & E. Gritter, Corporate Criminal Liability in the Netherlands, 
ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L., Dec. 2010 (vol. 14.3), at 3, http://www.ejcl.org/143/art143-9.pdf 
(citing J. DE HULLU, MATERIEEL STRAFRECHT – OVER ALGEMENE LEERSTUKKEN VAN 
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Court has established that for a corporation to be criminally liable in the 
Netherlands, the conduct which gave rise to the actions in question has to 
be “reasonably” imputed to the corporation.167 Conduct is reasonably 
imputed to the corporation if it took place within the corporation’s scope.168 
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands has “enunciatively summed up four 
situations or ‘groups of circumstances’ in which conduct, in principle, may 
be said to be carried out ‘within the scope of a corporation.’”169 Two 
situations particularly relevant to the Kiobel Petitioners are where (1) “the 
corporation gained profit from the conduct concerned” and (2) “the course 
of action was at the ‘disposal’ of the corporation, and the corporation has 
‘accepted’ the conduct—acceptance including the failure to take reasonable 
care to prevent the conduct from being performed.”170  
If Shell is found to have violated criminal law of the Netherlands, they 
are subject to primary and secondary sanctions under the Dutch Penal 
Code.171 A corporation disciplined under a primary sanction can be fined 
for each individual violation committed.172 A corporation disciplined under 
a secondary sanction could face the forfeiture of certain rights, assets, or 
                                                                                                                 
STRAFRECHTELIJKE AANSPRAKELIJKHEID NAAR NEDERLANDS RECHT, VIERDE DRUK 163 
(2009)). 
Some scholars tend to restrict the scope of Art. 51 DPC by excluding offences 
of a more physical nature, such as rape. In our opinion, a corporation can be 
criminally liable, regardless of the nature of the offence. Whether a corporation 
in a particular case should be prosecuted for a more physical offence like rape 
or battery is another matter (please note that the Dutch prosecution service 
(Openbaar Ministerie) does not operate a system recognising the principle of 
mandatory prosecution, meaning that the legality principle does not apply). 
Id. 
 167. Id. at 5. 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. at 7.  
 172. Id. (“The DPC [Dutch Penal Code] sets a maximum fine for each criminal offence. 
There are six categories. The first category maximum is EUR 370; the sixth category 
maximum is EUR 740,000. Every criminal offence is assigned to one of the first five 
categories. However, the DPC has a special provision for fines and legal persons. Where a 
legal person is convicted and the applicable category does not allow for appropriate 
punishment, a fine from the next higher category may be imposed (Article 23 DPC). 
Therefore, if the criminal offence is assigned to the fifth category (EUR 74,000) a fine of 
EUR 740,000 may be imposed on conviction of a legal person. However, the question 
remains whether EUR 740,000 is an appropriate punishment in the most serious cases.”). 
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publication of the verdict.173 Finally, outside of the Dutch Penal Code, 
corporations committing criminal offenses may be sanctioned under the 
Economic Offenses Act, “regarding specified criminal offenses related to 
regulation of economic activities, including environmental law.”174 
The Dutch Penal Code is applicable to any Dutch person who commits a 
crime outside of the Netherlands, “where the act constitutes a criminal 
offense according to the law of the State whose territory the crime was 
committed.”175 Shell’s actions in Nigeria constituted human rights 
violations under the Nigerian constitution, tort law, and international law. 
Thus, the actions which gave rise to Kiobel in Nigeria could be a basis for 
liability under Dutch law, provided that any Dutch citizens were directly 
involved in enforcing the criminal offenses in Nigeria. Alternatively, if the 
actions of Shell Nigeria can be directly attributable to Shell in the 
Netherlands, Shell could also be subject to Dutch law.  
The first of two options requires showing that a Dutch citizen is directly 
involved in enforcing the criminal offenses in Nigeria. Although this would 
be the easiest way to satisfy the requirements under Dutch law, it places a 
heavier evidentiary burden on the Kiobel Petitioners. This claim requires 
the names of individual Dutch actors who played a role in aiding and 
abetting the Nigerian government in harming the Petitioners. This 
information could, however, be in Mrs. Kiobel’s possession, as she has 
openly offered to share private documents including affidavits of key 
witnesses and other relevant case documents.176 
The second option would be to show that the actions of Shell Nigeria are 
directly attributable to Shell in the Netherlands. In other words, under the 
second option, Shell as the parent company would be accountable for 
SPDC’s actions. Unless a pure vicarious liability theory could prevail, the 
Kiobel Petitioners would also have the burden of proving that Shell had 
actual or constructive knowledge of SPDC’s violative practices in 
Ogoniland.   
Regardless of the theory by which Shell of the Netherlands is criminally 
liable for the actions which gave rise to Kiobel, Shell might still be able to 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Id. “Publication of the verdict can be a very effective sanction but is not often 
imposed, perhaps because the media attention surrounding the prosecution will usually 
already done a lot of damage to the legal person.” Id. (citing Court of Rotterdam 13 June 
2000, LJN: AA6189). 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id.  
 176. Esther Kiobel is cited to have offered to disclose materials to rebut claims that Shell 
had no financial relationship with the Nigerian military.  
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raise a defense to excuse them from culpability. Under the Dutch Penal 
Code, Shell could raise any available defense allowed under Dutch criminal 
law.177 Their strongest defense against the conduct in Nigeria would be a 
lack of sufficient culpability, which also requires specific important 
grounds for exculpation such as a showing of due diligence.178 Again, the 
feasibility of vindication on these grounds hinges on the level of 
engagement the Dutch actors themselves had with the Nigerian government 
and Shell Nigeria, and the extent to which Shell Nigeria’s offenses can be 
attributed to them.  
If the Kiobel Petitioners cannot successfully bring a claim in the 
Netherlands, then Shell of the Netherlands could still face a direct or 
derivative liability suit from its shareholders. The Dutch civil code requires 
“managing directors to fulfil [sic] their duties towards the legal entity with 
due care and attention.”179 If they fail to fulfill this duty, the managing 
directors of the company are personally responsible for any damage caused 
to the company as a result.180 Similar to a derivative liability suit in the 
United States, Dutch law requires showing that Shell’s directors engaged in 
“serious misconduct.”181 The Dutch Supreme Court has found the actions of 
managing directors to amount to serious misconduct in situations where a 
reasonably prudent manager acting in a similar circumstance would not take 
the same measures.182 Examples of this type of conduct include engaging in 
fraud or illegal conduct.183 Thus, depending on Royal Dutch Shell’s 
involvement in SPDC’s human rights violations in Ogoniland, its chief 
officers may be liable to its shareholders for their role in the actions that led 
to the Kiobel complaint. 
E. Avenues for Relief Under United Kingdom Law 
Royal Dutch Shell’s registered office is in London, United Kingdom.184 
Given this presence in the United Kingdom, the Kiobel Petitioners could 
seek relief under the law of the United Kingdom. Ongoing developments in 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Keulen & Gritter, supra note 166, at 6. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Liability of Directors, LEEMAN VERHEIJDEN HUNTJENS, http://www.kernkamp.nl/en/ 
services/company-and-corporate-law/personal-liability-of-directors-in-the-netherlands/ (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2013).  
 180. Id.  
 181. Id.  
 182. Id.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Shell at a Glance, supra note 113. 
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United Kingdom case law could make United Kingdom courts more 
hospitable to claims against SPDC.   
Recent developments in the United Kingdom case law offer hope for the 
Kiobel Petitioners. The High Court of London is set to hear an oil spill case 
by 11,000 Nigerian citizens of the Bodo community against SPDC.185 The 
Bodo community plaintiffs allege that SPDC spilled 500,000 barrels of oil 
in 2008.186 Shell has admitted liability for two of the spills, but maintains 
that the amount of oil spilled is less than the Bodo community alleges.187  
Akin to the Netherlands courts, the actions of Shell’s parent company 
have not been challenged in the United Kingdom.188 In Bodo, SPDC 
admitted liability in return for the dismissal of its parent company’s 
liability.189 The Financial Times projects Bodo will payout at $400 million, 
a number Shell maintains is “highly over-exaggerated.”190 Regardless of the 
case’s settlement, this action seems to show a positive shift in United 
Kingdom courts towards actions against SPDC.  
Reform in European Law also supports a positive shift towards liability 
against multi-national companies for actions taking place outside of the 
United Kingdom. In 2005, the European Court of Justice191 (ECJ) 
effectively abolished forum non-conveniens.192 The ECJ “interpreted the 
Brussels I regulation on jurisdiction to require courts in each European 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Bodo Cmty. v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria, [2012] EWHC (QB) 
HQ11X01280 (Nigeria); Michael D. Goldhaber, U.K. Shell Deal Spotlights Value of Common 
Law Model for Human Rights Litigation, ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC.COM (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2011/08/31/u-k-shell-deal-spotlights-value-of-common-law-mod 
el-for-human-rights-litigation/.   
 186. Erik Larson, Shell Sued in U.K. over ‘Massive’ 2008 Nigerian Oil Spills, 
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Mar. 23, 2012, 12:02 PM CDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2012-03-23/shell-sued-in-u-k-over-massive-oil-spills-in-nigeria-in-2008. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: A 
Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 127, 130 (2013) [hereinafter Goldhaber, 
Corporate Human Rights Litigation]. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. (quoting Sylvia Pfeifer & Jane Croft, Shell’s Nigeria Pay-Out Could Top £250m, 
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2011, 7:21 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4209f536-bde8-11e0-
ab9f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3TyY3nxLG). 
 191. The European Court of Justice interprets European Union (EU) Law and ensures its 
proper application. In addition to this, the ECJ decides legal disputes between EU 
governments and institutions, or any claim against an EU. Court of Justice of the European 
Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_ 
en.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2014).  
 192. Id.  
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nation to assert jurisdiction over corporations that are domiciled or centrally 
administered in the EU.”193 Consequently, the Kiobel Petitioners could seek 
redress in United Kingdom courts. 
III. Increasing Transparency Between Oil Companies and Nigerian 
Citizens 
Another key concern raised by the Kiobel decision is the proper means of 
interaction between international oil companies, such as Shell, and the 
indigenous communities in which they operate. Perhaps the greatest insult 
to Nigeria’s existence is despite its vast potential revenue from oil 
production, its citizens—particularly in the Niger Delta where the majority 
of Nigeria’s oil and gas is produced—have yet to reap any of the benefits of 
production.194 At the heart of the Kiobel case are Nigerian citizens 
protesting the unsafe operating practices in their communities. Their 
primary purpose in protesting was simply to have their voice heard. Oil 
companies should take measures to reduce the harsh impact on the Nigerian 
environment and to foster better relationships with Nigerian tribes.  
The easiest fix to the problems leading to the protests in Kiobel would be 
to provide safer operating practices. Nigeria flares 17.2 billion cubic meters 
of natural gas per year in the Niger Delta.195 Gas flaring is the “burning of 
natural gas from the ground."196 Residents in the Niger Delta complain of 
“respiratory problems, skin rashes, and eye irritations” as a result of gas 
flaring.197 The Nigerian government has responded to this problem by 
passing the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, which requires “every 
company producing oil and gas in Nigeria to submit preliminary 
                                                                                                                 
 193. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation, supra note 188, at 132 (quoting 
Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. 1383 (interpreting Council Regulation 
44/2001, 2000 O.J. (L12/1) (EC) “on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters”)).  
 194. “Th[e] rise in oil wealth has not translated into significant increases in living 
standards in Nigeria, however. In fact, the rise in poverty and inequality coincides with the 
discovery and export of oil in Nigeria.”  Kate Higgins, Regional Inequality in the Niger 
Delta: Policy Brief No. 5, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INST., http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi. 
org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3383.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014).  
 195. Anslem O. Ajugwo, Negative Effects of Gas Flaring: The Nigerian Experience, SCI. 
& EDUC. PUBLISHING, http://pubs.sciepub.com/jephh/1/1/2/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2013).  
 196. Id.  
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programmes for gas re-injection and detailed plans for implementation of 
gas re-injection.”198  
Unfortunately, little has been done to actually enforce this act. Gas 
flaring renders communities uninhabitable. Contaminants from gas flaring 
can “acidify the soil,” depleting its nutrients.199 This destroys the livelihood 
of the villagers who depend on agriculture for subsistence.  
Nigerian law requires oil companies to either save or re-inject natural gas 
into the subsurface to eliminate the need for flaring.200 When gas is re-
injected into the ground, it increases the reservoir pressure and ultimately 
enhances oil recovery.201 However, gas flaring is less expensive than re-
injection, and many of Nigeria’s reservoirs make re-injection difficult.202  
Another alternative to gas flaring is to collect, process, and sell the gas to 
international markets.203 This alternative benefits international oil 
companies while eliminating the harsh effects of flaring. However, like re-
injection, selling excess gas may not be feasible in Nigeria. Unfortunately, 
there is not as great of enough market for buying gas to offset costs of 
creating the requisite infrastructure to sell gas.204  
Apart from safer drilling practices, such as gas re-injection, events that 
gave rise to Kiobel could be prevented with increased communication 
between oil companies and indigenous groups such as the Ogonis. “The oil 
companies in Nigeria have historically maintained the basic position that to 
take a stance on human rights issues would be to interfere in the internal 
politics of the country, something that would not be a legitimate activity for 
a foreign commercial entity."205 An ideal system of accountability would 
have to actively involve a “triad of parties: indigenous peoples, the 
                                                                                                                 
 198. Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, POL’Y & LEGAL ADVOC. CENTRE, http://www. 
placng.org/lawsofnigeria/node/26 (last visited Dec. 16, 2013).  
 199. Ajugwo, supra note 195. 
 200. Ashley Palomaki, Flames Away: Why Corporate Social Responsibility Is Necessary 
to Stop Excess Natural Gas Flaring in Nigeria, 24 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & 
ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 507 (2013) (citing Global Gas Flaring Reduction Initiative: Report on 
Consultations with Stakeholders 8 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 27275, 2004)).  
 201. Id. at 504 (citing INT’L ASS’N OF OIL & GAS PRODUCERS, REPORT NO. 2.79/288, 
FLARING & VENTING IN THE OIL & GAS EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INDUSTRY: AN 
OVERVIEW OF PURPOSE, QUANTITIES, ISSUES, PRACTICES, AND TRENDS 8 (2000)).  
 202. Id. at 507. 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id.  
 205. The Roles and Responsibilities of the International Oil Companies, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/Nigew991-10.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 
2014).  
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corporate or business actor engaged in the project, and the government 
which grants the corporate actor rights over the lands or resources at 
issue.”206 
The U’wa tribe of Columbia and the Canadian based company 
Occidental Petroleum provide an imperfect example for facilitating 
cooperation between indigenous tribes, government, and multinational oil 
companies.207 Under the U’wa tribe’s model, exploration licenses cannot be 
granted to any major oil company without first consulting the U’wa tribe.208 
This level of autonomy for the U’wa tribe was made possible after several 
years of Columbian constitutional reform.209 As of 1991, indigenous people 
in Columbia now fully possess ownership over traditional lands and 
resources.210  
The U’wa example is imperfect for Nigeria because the Nigerian 
government owns all of the land and oil resources in Nigeria.211 The 
Nigerian government may be unwilling to yield this power to indigenous 
groups. Despite this, the Nigerian government could benefit from 
borrowing the U’wa prior consultation system. As owners of the resources, 
the Nigerian government would still have the ultimate say. However, 
creating a forum for indigenous groups to voice their grievances could lead 
to more peaceful relations between oil companies and local communities.  
Conclusion 
 Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Petroleum held that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to the ATS, and can only be displaced where 
claims asserted under the ATS “touch and concern the territory of the 
United States . . . with sufficient force.”212 The Kiobel decision begged 
many questions, including: (1) under which circumstances can a future ATS 
claim meet the Kiobel requirements;  (2) what can be done to ease tensions 
between indigenous groups and multi-national companies to prevent the 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Lillian Aponte Miranda, The U’Wa and Occidental Petroleum: Searching for 
Corporate Accountability in Violations of Indigenous Land Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
651, 655 (2006-2007).  
 207. Id. at 651.  
 208. Id. at 656.  
 209. Id. at 657. 
 210. Id.; see Charles H. Roberts, U’wa vs. Oxy, COVERT ACTION Q., Summer 2002, 
available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Oil_watch/U%27Wa_Oxy.html. 
 211. See Trustec Oil & Gas, Inc. v. W. Atlas Int’l, Inc., 194 S.W. 3d 580, 582 n.5 (Tex. 
App. 2006). 
 212. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
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alleged atrocities in Kiobel; and (3) do any avenues for relief exist outside 
of the United States for the Kiobel petitioners? 
The first major concern raised by Kiobel is the touch and concern 
requirement. This language left lower courts and legal scholars alike 
scrambling to predict if and when a case can meet these requirements or if 
the ATS lives on after Kiobel. The district courts have offered that a claim 
by an alien plaintiff against a US citizen defendant, for actions which took 
place in the United States, yet caused harm outside of the United States is 
sufficient to displace the ATS’ presumption against extraterritoriality.  
 Although the Supreme Court dismissed the Kiobel Petitioners’ claims, 
the Kiobel Petitioners may still pursue several avenues of relief outside of 
the United States. Shell may still be liable under Nigerian law, the law of 
the Netherlands, and the law of the United Kingdom.  
Under Nigerian Law, the Kiobel respondents could be liable for violating 
domestic tort law, domestic environmental law, human rights law, and 
International human rights law. However, many of the remedies under 
Nigerian law prove to be more sound in theory than in practice. The Kiobel 
petitioners will likely be prejudiced in Nigerian courts for domestic law 
claims against the Nigerian government and oil giant, Shell. In addition to 
this, environmental provisions such as the Gas Re-Injection Act are 
unenforceable, as they have yet to be fully enacted. Finally, Nigeria has yet 
to ratify many of the International provisions, such as ILO 169, which could 
provide greater accountability for the Nigerian government and 
multinational corporations.  
The second major concern raised by Kiobel is what mechanisms can 
multinational oil companies employ to prevent similar causes of action in 
the future. Suits such as Kiobel can certainly be prevented by improving 
transparency levels between oil companies, the Nigerian government, and 
indigenous groups such as the Ogoni tribe. Nigeria could greatly benefit 
from fashioning a system similar to that of the U’wa tribe of Colombia. 
This type of system  would likely improve relations between multinational 
oil companies and indigenous groups.  
Fortunately for Mrs. Kiobel, the answer to the final major question raised 
by Kiobel—what avenues for relief remain after the Kiobel ruling—has a 
simpler remedy. Recent developments in the laws of both the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom offer hope for redress for the Kiobel petitioners. 
Both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are becoming more 
hospitable to claims brought against local based corporations such as Shell 
for actions which occurred in Nigeria. Mrs. Kiobel could have a viable 
claim under the law of the Netherlands or the United Kingdom. Thus, for 
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her purposes she need not “touch” the territory of the United States with 
any force in order to gain the relief she has sought for over a decade. 
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